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Abstract 
The article discusses sexual violence by ISIS against women in Iraq, particularly 
Yezidi women, against the historical background of broader sexual and gender-based 
violence. It intervenes in feminist debates about how to approach and analyse sexual 
and wider gender-based violence in Iraq specifically and the Middle East more 
generally.  Recognizing the significance of positionality, I argue against dichotomous 
positions and for the need to look at both macro structural configurations of power 
pertaining to imperialism, neo-liberalism and globalization on the one hand, and 
localised expressions of patriarchy, religious interpretations and practises and cultural 
norms on the other hand.  Finally, the article reflects on the question of what a 
transnational feminist solidarity might look like in relation to sexual violence by ISIS.   
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Introduction 
Recent developments in Iraq, in neighbouring Syria and elsewhere in the region 
where the so-called Islamic State (known as ISIS as well as daesh)
1
 has taken 
foothold, clearly raise the bar in terms of dehumanizing atrocities. The accounts of 
survivors of sexual violence at the hands of ISIS are beyond horrific. However, sexual 
violence, as we are witnessing now, did not emerge in a vacuum but Iraqi women and 
men have been confronted with sexual and broader gender-based violence
2
 pre-
invasion Iraq and, as well as in the post-invasion period. Without wanting to belittle 
the carnage and cruelties committed by ISIS, I have felt uneasy about the limited 
interest displayed by the media, policy makers and the general public with respect to 
the broad continuum of sexual and gender-based violence in present day Iraq, but also 
prior to the appearance of ISIS in Iraq. As feminist IR scholars like Cynthia Enloe 
(1987, 1990, 2000), Cynthia Cockburn (1999, 2004, 2007) and Annick T.R. Wibben 
(2004, 2011) amongst others, have argued, we need to recognise a continuum of 
violence before and after conflict and wars and from the personal/household to the 
international. More concretely, perpetrators of sexual and gendered violence exist on 
a broad spectrum in Iraq, including militia linked to the Iraqi government and other 
political parties, various insurgent groups who fought against the government and the 
former occupation, criminal gangs, family members and, until a few years ago, also 
the occupation forces. 
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My uneasiness also stems from a growing ambivalence in terms of feminist tactics 
and strategies at this historical juncture. It has been increasingly difficult for me to 
decide what a transnational feminist solidarity should look like in a context where 
many Iraqi feminists and the Kurdish resistance to ISIS fighting in Rojava (northern 
Syria) and elsewhere in the region, asked for military intervention in the form of air 
strikes. Having vehemently argued against the idea that military interventions could 
bring women‘s liberation in the context of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
subsequent occupation (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2003), I have found it impossible to articulate 
the same clear position in debates about targeted air strikes in Rojava (western 
Kurdistan/northern Syria) and Syria more broadly where my reactions were far more 
ambivalent and mixed.  
 
In what follows, I will argue that it is important to historicise and contextualise the 
extreme forms of sexual violence associated with ISIS, not in order to belittle its scale 
and detrimental consequences but to deepen our understanding about its roots, context 
and ways to tackle it. With my article I aim to intervene in recent feminist debates of 
how to approach and explain sexual violence in relation to the Middle East, while also 
paying attention to the various ways that sexual violence has been instrumentalised by 
a range of relevant constituencies and political actors. On a broader level, my 
intention here is to contribute to the discussions about challenges for transnational 
feminist politics.  
 
The article is based on my on-going research into the gendered implications of Ba‗thi 
dictatorship, war, invasion, occupation, militarism and Islamist extremism in the 
context of central and southern Iraq and the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI). Over the 
 4 
past 15 years I have aimed to document and analyse changing gender norms and 
relations in Iraq, the KRI and its diasporas. To this end, I have engaged in both 
participant observation and have so far interviewed mainly Iraqi women but also 
some men. In this article I am drawing on both previously published material (Al-Ali, 
2007; Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009) as well as unpublished and new empirical material 
gathered more recently in informal interviews with women‘s rights activists based in 
Baghdad, Amman, Erbil, Sulimaniya and London.  In what follows I will discuss 
sexual violence and how it has been instrumentalised and/or ignored during the Ba‗th 
regime and in the post-invasion period, before addressing more recent ISIS-related 
atrocities. However, I will start out reflecting on the significance of positionality 
when addressing sexual violence in Iraq and finish the article by addressing the 
challenge to articulate a coherent transnational feminist politics and solidarity at this 
specific historical juncture.  
    
 
Intersectional positionality 
I am frequently faced with a conundrum when talking about sexual violence in Iraq.  
Sexual violence is rampant. There is no question about it. However, also widespread 
is the political instrumentalization of sexual violence, often sensationalised and 
exaggerated in terms of scope and threat. It is used as an othering and dehumanizing 
device, whether in relation to sectarian conflict, the fraud and complex relations 
between western and Middle Eastern political leaders, or the demonization of asylum 
seekers and migrants. For example, those of us living in Europe are familiar with the 
obsessive discussions of honour crimes in the European politics of immigration. 
Without doubt honour-based crimes and killings are a serious problem, particularly in 
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relation to the Kurdish region and Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe (Alinia, 
2013; Beghikani, 2005, 2010; Mojab 2001, 2003). Yet, media and policy narratives 
around honour-based crimes are often incredibly essentialising, stigmatizing and 
glossing over complex situations and variations. The more recent debates about 
sexual harassment of women in Cologne by apparently largely Middle East/North 
African migrants and asylum seekers on New Year‘s Eve in Cologne has revealed the 
difficulty of addressing sexual violence and racism simultaneously.  
 
Discourses on sexual violence are frequently deployed as part of wider racist and 
sectarian culturalist discourses: where their ‗barbaric‖ culture is essentially different 
from ―our‖ civilised culture, and the way this difference is articulated most 
dramatically is over and with the bodies of women and the attitudes towards non-
heteronormative sexualities. I agree with Lila Abu Lughod‘s (2013) assessment in her 
book Do Muslim Women Need Saving? that blaming culture ―means not just 
flattening cultures, stripping moral systems of their complexity, and hiding the most 
modern political and social interventions that no community escapes; it means erasing 
history‖ (Abu-Lughod, 2013: 136). I also concur with Abu-Lughod that what is often 
missing in discussions is the recognition of the dynamic historical transformations and 
specific political economies that are affecting women, men, families, and everyday 
life in all communities (ibid.). 
  
In my earlier joint work with Nicola Pratt (2009), published as What kind of 
Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq, we discussed how women in Iraq 
have fared since the fall of the Ba‗th regime in 2003. Official rhetoric had put Iraqi 
women at centre stage, but we showed that in reality women‘s rights and women‘s 
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lives have been exploited in the name of competing political agendas. We also tried to 
challenge the widespread view - even amongst some progressive anti-war and peace 
activists - that something inherent in Muslim, Middle Eastern or Iraqi culture is 
responsible for the escalating violence and systematic erosion of women‘s rights. We 
argued that it was not Islam or ‗culture‘ that have pushed Iraqi women back into their 
homes. Instead, we blamed concrete and rapidly changing political, economic and 
social conditions as well as a wide range of national, regional and international actors 
(Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009). 
 
Over the past years, I have spent lots of time and energy as an academic and as an 
activist to argue against the "culturalization" of gender-related issues -particularly 
with reference to gender-based violence in the Iraqi context. For years, I have felt 
compelled to say and write: It's not about "their culture", but it is about political 
economies. It is about authoritarian dictatorships and conservative patriarchal 
interpretations and practices. It is about foreign interventions and invasions and their 
gendered politics (Al-Ali, 2014). I have made a case for the significance of 
intersectionality, i.e. that the struggle for women's rights intersects with the struggle 
against other inequalities, which, in Iraq translates into the struggles against 
imperialism, neo-liberal economics, authoritarianism, and, crucially as well, 
sectarianism.  
 
Being based in London, my feminism certainly also intersects with the struggle 
against racism and Islamophobia. Throughout I have tried to not become an 
apologetic in terms of systematic human and women's rights abuses in Iraq and 
elsewhere. Yet I have to admit that I am personally frustrated by my own constant 
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compulsion to fight Islamophobia and racism and, in that process, sometimes gloss 
over forms of gender-based and sexual violence, the political marginalization of 
women and men who do not fit heteronormative ideals, as well as extremely socially 
conservative attitudes towards gender norms and relations.  
And here I would diverge from Lila Abu Lughood‘s position in Do Muslim Women 
Need Saving? While I agree with her critique of the use and abuse of the call for 
women‘s rights in the context of justifying military interventions and policies and 
attitudes towards migrants, we cannot stop here. I was very humbled by a former 
student and feminist activist from Lebanon, Leen Hashem, who despaired on several 
occasions while doing her MA in Gender Studies with us at SOAS: ―Why are you 
western based feminist scholars stuck in your anti-orientalist and anti-Islamophobic 
discourses? Why are you privileging countering orientalism and imperialism to 
countering local and regional inequalities, including those linked to religious 
extremism?‖ Her frustration and despair was subsequently voiced by several other 
students and friends involved in feminist activism in the Middle East, and more 
recently articulated by Lama Abu Odeh (2015) in ―Holier than though: The anti-
imperialist versus the local activist‖. Abu Odeh breaks a taboo in forcefully critiquing 
anti-imperialist academics based particularly in the US who are critical of feminist 
and LGBTQ activists in the region.  
 
In practice, what the tension often boils down to is the question whether we should 
look at neo-colonial and imperialist policies (particularly those linked to the US and 
Israel), as well as neo-liberal economics as root causes for gender-based inequalities 
and forms of oppression in the Middle East, or whether we should look to national 
and local cultures and local manifestations of patriarchy. The divergent positions 
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became very accentuated in the reactions to Mona El Tahawy‘s (2012) controversial 
and problematic article entitled ―Why do they hate us? published in Foreign Policy in 
April 2012. As I have stated previously, there were lots of things problematic in Mona 
El Tahawy‘s article, which appeared to blame Middle Eastern men as a group for the 
oppression and discriminatory practices against Middle Eastern women as a group 
(Al-Ali, 2014). Several authors provided excellent critiques, pointing to the 
historically-rooted and structural injustices and forms of oppression, such as 
colonialism, capitalism, authoritarianism, patriarchy and neo-liberalism, affecting all 
women and men in the region (Seikaly & Mikdashi, 2012; Malik, 2012). Yet, despite 
my own reservations of the packaging, content and tone of El Tahawy‘s article, I felt 
uncomfortable with the lack of serious attempts to look inward, name and confront 
those attitudes, norms, practices and relations that can not be simply explained away 
by external and structural patterns, forces and processes. I would argue that this 
dichotomous approach – focusing on patriarchal cultural attitudes and practices on the 
one hand and imperialist policies and neo-liberal economics on the other - is 
unhelpful and more reflective of specific, and often quite divergent, positionalities 
rather than the complex empirical realities we are facing as activists and academics.  
 
Obviously I cannot escape my positionality and audiences, being based in London, 
which comes with certain responsibilities and points of emphasis. Yet, rather than 
contributing to the taboo and silencing of sexual and wider gender-based violence 
within domestic Iraqi politics on the one hand, and the sensationalising and 
essentialist culturalist discourses on the other, we need to find nuanced and truly 
intersectional ways to talk about it. Trying to avoid the straightjacket of location and 
positionality - however shifting that might be given people‘s multiple roles, 
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transnational involvements and contextual identities - calls for historicising to avoid 
essentialist notions of culture and identity. But it also requires attention to regional 
and local agencies, complicities, historically specific patriarchal articulations and 
practises, and, crucially, I would argue, a critical engagement with militarised and 
other newly emerging masculinities. In the Iraqi context today, this concretely 
translates into a recognition that US and UK actions and policies linked to the 
invasion and occupation have contributed to the deterioration of women‘s rights and 
the increase in gender-based and sexual violence, while simultaneously paying 
attention to and recognizing that local manifestations of militarised and neo-liberal 
patriarchal gender norms and relations are also rooted in regional, (trans)national and 
local power dynamics and struggles as well as historically specific contestations over 
resources, cultures and identities. Crucially, gender-based and sexual violence did not 
simply emerge post-2003 but have a history linked to the Ba‗th regime, which came 
into power in 1968 and lasted until 2003, and even further back the formation of Iraq 
as a nation state (Efrati, 2012). We also have to look carefully at the specific political 
and economic dynamics linked to the Kurdish Regional Government, particularly post 
-1991.  
 
Sexual violence during the Ba‘th regime 
Despite its repressive nature, the first decade of the Ba‗th regime has been largely 
characterised by its secularising and modernizing policies. Women‘s education and 
labour force participation were integral to the regime‘s attempt at creating a 
productive population that could be governed through the centralised mechanisms of 
an increasingly authoritarian state. I have elsewhere discussed at length the state‘s 
active intervention in challenging prevailing gender norms and relations, largely to 
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address the expanding economy and needs of the labour market (Al-Ali, 2007). 
Women‘s education and labour force participation was actively encouraged by the 
state which, throughout the 1970s and 80s, provided free childcare and an 
infrastructure that facilitated women‘s entry into the expanding labour force (ibid.). 
An in-depth analysis of the 35 years of Ba‗th regime does point to contradictory and 
changing policies and attitude towards women and gender, challenging any and 
generalised and often simplistic assessments.   
 
Clearly women living in urban areas not involved in opposition politics benefitted 
much more from the modernizing state policies than either women in the country- 
side or those in opposition of the regime, in fear of their lives. Reports and personal 
accounts by Iraqi women and men who were in opposition to the regime reveal that 
sexual violence was integral to the horrific regime of torture in Iraqi prisons during 
the Ba‗th era (Amnesty International, 2005; Al-Ali, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 
2014). However, there appear to be more documented cases of women having 
experienced sexual violence in prisons than men, which might be a result of the 
greater social stigma attached for men experiencing sexual torture, abuse and rape.      
 
From the 1980s onwards, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war and the atrocities against 
the Kurdish population, women were increasingly used to demarcate boundaries 
between communities and carry the heavy burden of honour in a society that became 
more and more militarized. Women‘s patriotic duties shifted to producers of loyal 
Iraqi citizens and future fighters. Their bodies became progressively the sight of 
nationalist policies and battles (Rohde, 2010). During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), 
a series of legal decrees were introduced to control women‘s marital and reproductive 
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freedoms. In December 1982, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) issued a 
decree forbidding Iraqi women to marry non-Iraqis as well as another decree 
prohibiting Iraqi women married to non-Iraqis to transfer money or property to their 
husbands as inheritance (Omar, 1994: 63). At the same time, Iraqi men were 
encouraged to divorce their Iranian wives while Iraqi Arab men were encouraged to 
marry Kurdish women as part of the regime‘s Arabization policies in the north. 
During this period, Islamist and Kurdish women were tortured and sexually abused, 
humiliating not only the female victims but ‗dishonouring‘ their male relatives as well 
(Al-Ali, 2007: 168-169). 
 
The most known systematic killing but also sexual abuse took place during the 1987-
1988 Anfal campaign, nominally a counterinsurgency operation against Kurdish 
resistance, but in reality a carefully planned and executed programme of ethnic 
cleansing in which 50,000 - 200,000 people are estimated to have been killed, most of 
them men and adolescent boys
3
.  Thousands of Kurdish villages were systematically 
destroyed, and over a million and a half of their inhabitants deported to camps with no 
water, electricity or sewage. Others were executed on the way out of their villages. 
Under the leadership of Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, the Anfal 
campaign has been particularly associated with the use of chemical weapons, such as 
mustard and nerve gas. Long- term effects have included various forms of cancer, 
infertility, and congenital diseases. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss at 
any length the scale and depth of sexual violence carried out against Kurdish women 
at the time. Choman Hardi (2011) as well as Karen Mlodoch (2009) have written in 
great depth about women‘s experiences and memories of Anfal. Hardi‘s moving book 
Gendered Experiences of Genocide: Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan-Iraq (2011) 
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addresses systematic sexual abuse, including rape, of women in camps. She also 
stresses that despite the large body of documents, and evidence available, outside the 
immediate media coverage, Anfal ―remained largely unrecognised by the 
international community‖ (p. 33). 
 
While the systematic rape and abuse of Kurdish women as part of the Anfal campaign 
and political prisoners or relatives of suspected opposition activists accounts for the 
largest scale of sexual violence, other high profile incidents on a smaller scale led to 
widespread fear and panic amongst the population, particularly in Baghdad. Most 
notorious are the crimes committed by Uday, the son of Saddam Hussein, who 
regularly kidnapped and raped young Iraqi women and girls for his sexual 
gratification. Several women I interviewed over the past decade remembered vividly 
stories of young women having been kidnapped and the widespread fear these 
incidents triggered in their families. Alya G., for example, of middle class 
background, who was a teenager in the 1980s and a young woman in the 1990s 
growing up in Baghdad, bemoaned that her freedom of movement was severely 
curtailed by the fear of Uday: 
 
My mother had much more freedom growing up in Baghdad in the 60s 
and 70s than what myself and my sisters had when we grew up. My 
family was quite open and liberal, but my parents were very worried about 
us being seen by Uday or one of his entourage. We knew a family whose 
daughter had been kidnapped and raped by Uday. It was horrible. The 
family was supportive of her, but she never really recovered from that 
ordeal and she experienced lots of stigma because of it. After that 
 13 
happened, my parents became very strict with us, and we were not 
allowed to go out on our own. My father was also much more strict about 
what we could wear. 
 
Uday and his notorious militia are also linked to the wave of killings of alleged sex 
workers and panderers in 2000. Resonating the accounts of several Iraqi women I 
talked to, who told me of their horror when they heard about the beheading of several 
hundred alleged women, an Amnesty International report (2001) states:  
 
In October dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without 
any judicial process in Baghdad and other cities. Men suspected of 
procurement were also beheaded. The killings were reportedly carried out in 
the presence of representatives of the Ba‗ath Party and the Iraqi Women's 
General Union. Members of Feda'iyye Saddam, a militia created in 1994 by 
'Uday Saddam Hussain, used swords to execute the victims in front of their 
homes. Some victims were reportedly killed for political reasons. 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as the regime increasingly resorted to violence, 
including sexual violence, to keep control of the progressively disaffected population, 
Iraqi human and women‘s rights activists in the diaspora, particularly those based in 
the UK and the US, tried to raise awareness and obtain support amongst western 
politicians and the media. Layla G., a London-based leftist women‘s rights activist 
told me: 
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During and after the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, we tried many 
times to get this government‘s attention. When Saddam was using 
chemical weapons on the Kurds, did any politician do anything in this 
country? Our Kurdish sisters were beaten and raped by soldiers. We wrote 
to our MPs, we wrote letters to the government, we tried to organize 
events. Hardly anyone wanted to listen and pay attention. All of a sudden, 
after 9/11, the British and American politicians are very eager to hear 
about women being raped by Saddam‘s regime. Also, everyone started to 
talk abut the beheading of prostitutes even if that happened 10 years 
before without any western politician protesting. 
 
Layla, as many other Iraqi women activists I talked to over the years, acknowledges 
that sexual violence took place during the Ba‗th regime. Yet, at the same time, she 
questions the timing and the way that American and British politicians and the media 
started to focus on sexual violence in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the run up to the 
invasion. However, a handful of women whom I interviewed shortly after the 
invasion vehemently denied the atrocities committed against Kurds by the Iraqi 
regime and Iraqi soldiers. It was not always clear to me whether they genuinely 
believed that these atrocities did not happen but it seemed to me that they had 
willingly bought into regime propaganda despite the fact that a large part of the 
population seemed to have been aware that the regime‘s rhetoric was not to be trusted. 
  
Nicola Pratt and myself (2009) have argued previously that Iraqi women were 
instrumentalised in the run up to the invasion, and during the occupation. For 
example, high-ranking US officials, including then National Security Advisor 
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Condoleezza Rice and Vice-President Dick Cheney, met with Women for a Free Iraq, 
a newly formed group of Iraqi opposition activists backed by the State Department 
post 9/11, to hear their personal stories and to discuss the future of the country (Al-Ali 
& Pratt 2009: 56). The US State Department publicized the abuses experienced by 
women at the hands of the Iraqi regime—including beheadings, rape and torture 
(Office of International Women‘s Issues 2003). In the UK, Tony Blair met a 
delegation of Iraqi women in November 2002 (Russell 2002) and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office listed the regime‘s crimes against women as part of its dossier 
on human rights abuses in Iraq (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2002).  
 
The timing of this sudden interest in the plight of Iraqi women cannot be 
overemphasized. For decades, many Iraqi women activists in the US and UK had tried 
to raise awareness about the systematic abuse of human and women‘s rights under 
Saddam Hussein, the atrocities linked to the Anfal campaign against the Kurds as well 
as the impact of economic sanctions on women and families (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009: 
56). Yet, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, their voices remained largely unheard 
amongst western politicians who initially regarded Saddam Hussein as an ally in the 
fight against the Islamic regime in Iran. Later, after the invasion of Kuwait, when 
Saddam Hussein ceased to be regarded as an ally, the debate around economic 
sanctions and the broader humanitarian crisis subsumed more gender-specific forms 
of violence and human rights abuses. Yet, during the sanctions period (1990-2003), 
the combination of economic crisis, high levels of unemployment, changing state 
rhetoric and policies as well a shift towards greater religiosity led to an increase in 
social conservatism and a growth in discriminatory practices and sexual forms of 
violence, such as domestic violence, polygamy, and prostitution.      
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Post-invasion and occupation 
The US partly justified its invasion of Iraq by calling attention to the abuse of women 
by the regime of Saddam Hussein (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009). International agencies and 
NGOs received money (mostly from the US and the UK) to train women to enable 
their participation in peace-building, reconstruction and the transition to democracy 
(ibid.). Delegations of self-selected Iraqi women visited Washington regularly after 
the invasion, holding press conferences hosted by the State Department and meeting 
President Bush at the White House in November 2003 (White House Press Secretary 
2003). When my colleague Nicola Pratt visited Washington, DC, in 2005, a number 
of officials were keen to stress the US administration‘s concern to support women in 
Iraq and to see them play a role in the country‘s future (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009: 57).  
 
However, despite the rhetoric of supporting and liberating women, women and gender 
issues quickly dropped of the agenda of both the occupation forces and Iraqi 
politicians. Since 2003, Iraqi women and men have faced high levels of insecurity, 
coupled with the lack of rule of law, both contributing to increasing and wide-ranging 
forms of gender-based and sexual violence. Other main challenges relate to an on-
going humanitarian crisis and lack of functioning and adequate infrastructure, 
widespread corruption and a non-functioning authoritarian and sectarian state that 
heavily relies on militia and repression. Rampant domestic violence, verbal and 
physical intimidation, sexual harassment, rape, forced marriage  - as well as increases 
in mu’tah or so-called pleasure marriages4 - trafficking, forced prostitution, female 
genital mutilation, and honour-based crimes, including killings, have been very much 
part of the post-invasion experience.  
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Several reports and interviews with Iraqi women‘s rights activists suggested already a 
few years after the invasion that in a context of widespread unemployment and 
poverty, women were particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation. This view was 
also expressed by a leading women‘s rights activist from Baghdad who told me: ―The 
fragility of state institutions and the failure of the rule of law has created room for 
human trafficking gangs, especially for the trafficking of women and girls for sexual 
exploitation and prostitution.‖ Women and girls from poor families in search of 
employment have been the most frequent victims of trafficking. It is not only Iraqi 
criminal gangs that have been involved in shipping women and girls to Syria, Jordan, 
Qatar and other Gulf countries but, according to Human Rights Watch (2011), some 
Iraqi police officers have also been involved.  
 
According to a comprehensive report published in 2011 by the Heartland Alliance for 
Human Needs and Human Rights, gender–based violence has been institutionalized: 
violence against women is not sufficiently criminalized and victims face harsh laws 
and practices that treat victims as criminals. Any protective laws that might exist have 
been rarely implemented as the police and judges treat gender-based crimes and 
sexual violence leniently and allow perpetrators to act with impunity. No doubt, and 
as I stated earlier, sexual violence existed before 2003. Yet, the failure to protect 
women and establish proper awareness mechanisms and procedures over the last 
years is one of the major failures and responsibilities of the international community, 
particularly the US and the UK, alongside the main Iraqi political actors, parties and 
governments. As early as 2005, an Iraqi women‘s rights activist stated in an interview 
with me: 
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The Iraqi army and police are not just failing to prevent violence against 
women, but they are part of the problem. They treat women who have been 
victims of domestic violence or rape during kidnappings, for example, without 
any respect and some even consider them to be guilty. Also we know of cases 
where women have been harassed and even raped at police stations and inside 
prisons. We have tried to raise this with our politicians, but they are not 
listening. The Americans and British are also busy with other issues and do 
not pursue our complaints.   
 
Almost a decade later, a Human Rights Watch report (2014) addresses the systematic 
corruption and flaws of the Iraqi criminal system. While both men and women are 
affected, women are particularly vulnerable as they are frequently detained as a 
punishment for male family members who have allegedly committed a crime or have 
been engaged in political activities. Due to the stigma attached to imprisonment, 
particularly given the risk of torture and sexual abuse, women face further harassment 
and ostracising within their communities and families once freed. The report states 
that: 
 
[…] women are subjected to threats of, or actual sexual assault 
(sometimes in front of husbands, brothers, and children.) Some detainees 
reported a lack of adequate protection for female prisoners from attacks 
by male prison guards, including those from adjoining male prisons. Two 
women reported that sexual assault by prison guards resulted in 
pregnancy. Women and officials reported that the likelihood of a woman 
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being subject to sexual assault is far higher during arrest and 
interrogation, prior to a woman‘s confinement in prison.―[W]e expect that 
they‘ve been raped by police on the way to the prison,‖ Um Aqil, an 
employee at a women‘s prison facility told Human Rights Watch (Human 
Rights Watch 2014). 
 
According to several reports, US forces knew that detainees were being tortured and 
ill-treated at places of detention under the control of the Interior Ministry, which they 
frequently visited (Amnesty International 2006). Yet, British and American troops not 
only turned a blind eye to the violence committed by the Iraqi army, various militia 
and criminal gangs, but were also active perpetrators of sexual violence. Over the 
years, several of my respondents who are involved in human and women‘s rights 
activism, have talked about various instances and cases of harassment at check points 
and during house searches, torture, sexual abuse and rape in prisons, mainly as part of 
counter-insurgency campaigns. In 2005, Amnesty International reported that female 
detainees had been tortured, threatened with rape, subjected to sexual abuse, possibly 
including rape.  
 
It is important to stress that gender-based and sexual violence does not only affect 
women and girls: men and boys are also targeted and impacted. Most visible have 
been the instances of sexual violence of male Iraqi prisoners at the hands of the US 
army in Abu Ghraib prison (Amnesty International 2006, Human Rights Watch 
2004). The shocking images of naked hooded Iraqi men have become emblematic of 
larger human rights abuses and atrocities in the name of democracy and human rights 
at the hands of the occupation. However, men have also been attacked by militias 
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linked to political parties as well as insurgent groups for not adhering to heterosexual 
gender norms. Men ―suspected‖ of homosexual conduct or not being ―manly‖ enough 
have become increasingly at risk and have been harassed and killed by Islamist militia 
(Human Rights Watch 2009).  In 2012, a wave of so-called emo killings targeted 
mainly teenage boys and young men whose hair- styles, clothes and music choice 
were perceived to be too effeminate by the attackers (Long, 2012). What emerges in 
central and southern Iraq is a toxic cocktail of Islamist sectarianism, authoritarianism 
and increased militarization of society, all exacerbating the glorification of militarized 
masculinities, often directly linked with ever more violent acts.  
 
The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI)  
In the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI), de facto autonomous since 1991, the situation is 
generally much better in terms of security, an improved infrastructure, a working 
parliament with active participation of female MPs and numerous women‘s 
organisations and rights activists who have managed to push through several relevant 
legal reforms. However, gender-based and sexual violence are also rampant, 
specifically in the form of honour-based crimes and killings, female suicides, self- 
burning and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). The KRG has used women‘s and 
gender-based issues to demarcate itself from the central government in Baghdad, 
stressing its democratic and more secular and progressive values. This has helped 
women‘s rights activists and female MPs to make some headway in relation to the 
legal protection of women and the criminalization of gender-based violence. Yet, as 
Begikhani (2005, 2010) and others have pointed out, in reality the KRG appears to be 
less invested in actually implementing new legislation and tends to pursue more 
traditional ways of addressing gender-based and sexual violence, using tribal and 
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family dispute mechanisms, often to the detriment of women receiving justice.  
Despite the generally more secular and progressive context in comparison to central 
and southern Iraq, one cannot help but notice the way that Kurdish politicians 
instrumentalise gender issues.  
 
Several authors have discussed and analysed gender-based and sexual violence in the 
KRI with reference to patriarchy, tribal culture, nationalism, militarism and Islamism 
(Mojab, 2001, 2004; Beghikani 2005, 2010). More recently, Minoo Alinia (2013) has 
provided an in-depth analysis of honour-based crimes, paying attention to the way 
that various power structures intersect to produce a ―hegemonic honour discourse‖. 
Looking at the intersections of ethnic and national oppression, economic 
marginalization, patriarchy, religion, tribal and kinship structures as well as 
displacement and militarization of society, Alinia also stresses the significance of 
prevailing notions of masculinity in controlling women‘s bodies, their sexuality and 
―honour‖.  
 
While Alinia is moving away from the more generalised explanations pertaining to 
culture, religion, tribalism and nation, Mariwan Kanie (2015) provides further nuance 
and in-depth insight by pointing to shifts in social, political and economic norms and 
values as resulting in a ―normative disorientation‖, and the emergence of new forms 
of masculinities alongside the older hegemonic peshmerga masculinities, all 
contributing to an increase in gender-based violence. In my view,  ―normative 
disorientation‖ is an excellent analytical lens to explore the impact of more recent 
political, social and economic changes in the KRI. But I would also argue that an 
intersectional approach is key, and that we need to be very specific in terms of the 
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relevant intersecting oppressive structures as Alinia suggest. Patriarchy, nationalism 
tribalism and Islamism as well as hegemonic masculinities, shift in specific historical 
contexts and in line with changing political economies and require in depth empirical 
research to adequately delineate. This later insight is not only relevant for the KRI but 
more broadly applicable, and is certainly also poignant when analysing sexual 
violence in central and southern Iraq.  
 
Throughout Iraq and the KRI, perpetrators of gender-based and sexual violence have 
cut across diverse ethnic, religious and class backgrounds and have ranged from the 
occupation forces, government officials and militants, resistance and insurgent 
groups, criminal gangs to relatives and families. The various forms of violence are 
working to reconfigure masculinities and femininities in the post-invasion context. 
But they are also actively employed as tools for new forms of militarised, 
authoritarian as well as sectarian politics. Despite its rhetoric, the occupation forces, 
particularly the US, quickly dropped any initial commitment to gender-based equality 
and justice. Similar to the largely sectarian and corrupt Iraqi political elite, the US and 
UK politicians and the military not only compromised on gender issues as part of 
their overall shift from human to national security, but also contributed to the increase 
and intensity of sexual violence since the invasion.     
 
 
ISIS: Doctrinally justified sexual violence 
Gruelling images and reports of sexually violated Yezidi women and girls have 
circulated widely within the media and policy-circles since ISIS took over Mosul and 
key western cities in Iraq in 2014. Accounts of systematic and organized sexual 
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slavery, forced marriages, sexual assault and rape have shocked and shaken many 
people around the world. In addition to the enormity and scale of the abuse, what has 
made these sexual atrocities and forms of dehumanization particularly appalling are 
the sexual enslavement and treatment of religious minorities by ISIS fighters.
5
 
Yezidis (Ezidis), an ancient religious minority with ethnically Kurdish background, 
have been most vulnerable, but other religious minorities such as Christians, Sabean, 
Shabak, Turkmen but also Shi‘a and even Sunni women have been abused by ISIS 
fighters. There have been numerous accounts of widespread rape of religious minority 
women under the banner of jihad al nikah (sexual intercourse in pursuit of struggle) 
with fighters not waiting for unmarried girls to ―volunteer‖ and offer themselves to 
the male fighters. The promise of sexual access to women and girls has been central 
to ISIS‘ recruitment strategy and propaganda materials (UN 2015). 
 
The unprecedented scale and level of brutality by ISIS fighters has been documented 
widely (Amnesty International 2014, Human Rights Watch 2015, UNAMI OHCHR 
2014, UN News Centre 2015).  The accounts of the survivors, mainly young female 
Yezidi survivors of captivity, sexual enslavement, beatings, forced marriage and rape 
are heart wrenching and impossible to summarise here. According to my interviews, 
with Iraqi/Kurdish women‘s rights activists, many women seem to have been handed 
from one fighter to another, sometimes sold and sometimes given as presents. Rape 
and forced marriage appears to be part of a broader genocide of Yezidis and a 
systematic dehumanization of non-Muslim religious minorities. Regular occurrences 
of sexual violence are integral to ISIS‘ extreme form of asserting a militarised and 
dominant masculinity, embedded in a hyper-patriarchal system of rigid and polarised 
gender roles. Aside from the scale of the atrocities, what makes the violence so 
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particularly gruesome is the way that ISIS engages in doctrinal justifications. In 
October 2014, for example, ISIS‘ English language publication Dabiq stated that its 
fighters had given captured Yezidi women and girls to its members as ―spoils of war.‖ 
The publication justifies sexual violence claiming that Islam permits sex with non-
Muslim ―slaves,‖ including girls, as well as beating and selling them (HRW 2015). In 
a later issue of Dabiq (no 9), in the section ―From our sisters‖, a female ISIS member 
published a long essay on the role of female slaves within the so-called Islamic state, 
stressing the importance of conversion of infidels, including ―slave girls‖ (Al-
Muhajra, 2015).    
 
Yet, while the atrocities against Yazidi women and girls as well as other religious 
minorities are discussed widely within the media and policy circles, very little seems 
to be done to actually support those who escaped and survived. Several of my 
respondents stressed that general living conditions for Yezidi and Christian refugees 
are extremely difficult at a time when the KRG is already overstretched due to its 
hosting of hundreds of thousand of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs while being in an 
economic crisis due to a political stand off with the central government in Iraq. None 
of the European or North-American countries outraged by ISIS violence has offered 
to take in a substantial number of Yezidi refugees or to seriously help the KRG to 
deal with the refugee crisis. 
     
Within the Yezidi community there is still a very strong stigma around rape, and, 
according to Amnesty International, and a number of Kurdish women‘s rights 
activists who have worked with Yezidi women, many families would speak of 
systematic rape but deny any of their female relatives were affected (AI 2014). At the 
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same time, AI researchers have witnessed that women and girls who escaped ISIS 
captivity are put under pressure to speak to the media, often without seeking informed 
consent (ibid): 
  
One woman told Amnesty International that she went to a place where she 
thought she would be receiving medical care for her panic attacks, but 
instead found a television crew wanting to interview her. Two others said 
that they received a visit from a foreign man who said he was a doctor, 
but seemed to be a journalist: ―He said that to cure our depression we 
should get out of the house and go for walks in the fields and sit in the 
sun. He had a large video camera and filmed us but said that our faces 
would not be shown.‖ Three other girls who received the visit of a 
television crew while they were being interviewed by an Amnesty 
International researcher said that they did not want to speak to journalists 
but that they felt they could not refuse because the family who hosted 
them had brought the journalists to them (Amnesty International 2014). 
 
According to Human Rights Watch (2015), it is not clear that doctors have always 
obtained informed consent before conducting medical examinations to check whether 
a girl or woman has been raped. Some women also never receive the test results. It is 
clear that abuse does not necessarily stop after the escape from ISIS.   
 
Deniz Kandiyoti (2007) challenges us to problematize the different modalities of 
sexual and gender-based violence in relation to diverse social actors in Afghanistan, 
differentiating between the ‗privatised‘ violence within families as opposed to the 
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forms of violence used in conflict as a systematic tool intimidation, and finally the 
public performances of Islamic retribution we came to associate with the Taliban. The 
type of violence perpetrated by ISIS fighters and propagated by the group can be 
compared to the performative Islamic retribution referred to by Kandiyoti. But similar 
to the Afghani context, the extreme violence of ISIS exists within a broader spectrum 
of sexual and gender-based violence taking place within the private sphere of 
families, on streets, at work places and schools and used by various militias and 
armed gangs as forms of warfare.   
 
Dilemmas for transnational feminist solidarity 
Sexual and gendered violence is not merely employed as a racist and othering 
discourse by imperialist powers, and right-wing constituencies in the west, but 
discourses about sexual violence have emerged at every single moment of political 
and sectarian tension in modern Iraq as a central polarizing and political device 
amongst politicians and activists. Theoretically and politically, as I have argued 
previously (Al-Ali, 2014), we need to recognise that sexual and gender-based 
violence underwrites much of the broader structural and political violence we are 
witnessing. It is central to sectarianism and to extreme forms of authoritarianism. Too 
often thought about as an add-on, sexual violence is, in fact, central to all forms and 
processes of delineating, controlling, oppressing, marginalizing and governing 
communities.  
 
Historicizing sexual violence allows us to challenge both the ―presentism‖ so 
widespread within media and policy discourses as well as essentialist notions about 
―their culture‖ or ―their religion‖. A historical approach reveals the complex interplay 
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of inter and trans-national, regional, national and local factors in shaping the specific 
political economies and socio-historical contexts in which sexual violence might 
become more widespread. In my view, and as discussed in detail above, a 
positionality rooted in transnational feminist politics needs to go beyond dichotomous 
positions of macro power configurations linked to imperialism, neo-liberalism and 
globalization on the one hand, and an attention to localised and regional inequalities 
and power configurations linked to patriarchy, cultural norms and religious 
interpretations and practises. Local practices of sexual and gendered violence are 
articulations not only of local patriarchies embedded in specific and often changing 
political economies but also transnational imperialism and neoliberalism. Crucially, 
however, I would argue that while macro processes clearly influence and shape local 
articulations and configurations of power, they cannot be collapsed into each other. 
Ironically, in my view, explaining away different forms of sexual violence solely by 
reference to the history of colonialism and imperialism, or in the Iraqi context, the 
history of the invasion and occupation, takes away agency of local actors, such as 
political leaders and militia, but also specific individual men, who historically have 
been complicit if not drivers of sexual violence as my historical discussion has shown. 
 
Talking about the ways in which sexual and gender-based violence is embedded 
within and productive of broader authoritarian, patriarchal, and fascistic, trends is a 
challenge. Mobilizing against sexual violence and engaging in advocacy work is even 
trickier and remains fraught with tensions (Al-Ali, 2014). As I tried to illustrate in this 
article, any political mobilization and demands are complicated by the continuum of 
sexual and gender-based violence evident at any given time, but rendered even more 
complex when taking a historical lens.  
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Like many other feminist academics and activists, I feel extremely conflicted in 
articulating a coherent transnational feminist solidarity at this historical juncture.  My 
previous political positions were clear in terms of rejecting imperialist and neo-
colonial military interventions and the need to find non-violent political solutions. 
However, purist pacifist notions and the call for non-violent resistance are absurd in 
the face of the threats and atrocities linked to ISIS. My position does not translate into 
a sudden embracing of military interventions as a way to liberate women, but 
recognises that in certain situations targeted military interventions might help those 
who are putting their lives at risk while resisting fascist and genocidal organizations 
and ideas. And here I am of course speaking mainly of the Kurdish women and men 
linked to the armed wings of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), that is the 
People‘s Protection Unit (PYG) and the Women‘s Defence Unit (YPJ), as well as the 
PYD‘s sister party: the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Their armed struggle is 
motivated by the aim to defend themselves and the hundreds of thousands of civilians 
at risk from ISIS violence. However, crucially, for them, armed struggle is not an end 
in and of itself but rather a necessity in the context of their broader political project 
that puts gender equality and justice as its centre. It is too early to assess if and how 
an egalitarian Democratic Confederalism as advocated by the imprisoned PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan plays out beyond female fighters and female political leaders. Yet, it 
is clear that the stated politics and practises of these political parties and movements, 
also resonating in Turkey‘s HDP party, have not only moved beyond a narrow 
Kurdish nationalism but present the most progressive and gender-sensitive vision we 
have in the region today.  
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This specific context, I would argue is radically different from the air strikes on ISIS 
targets in Syria more broadly. Not only is the prolonged military intervention in Syria 
contributing to the massive scale of human casualties and displaced people, thereby 
potentially increasing the radicalization of people, but also the nature of the Syrian 
conflict is also far more complex. In the wider Syrian context, targeted air strikes on 
specific ISIS targets are far less likely than they were in ISIS-occupied Kobane in 
Rojava (northern Syria or western Kurdistan). Meanwhile, the opposition to ISIS is 
also extremely heterogeneous, including many radical Islamist, highly misogynist and 
violent militia and armed groups. Finally, the current ill-conceived military 
intervention in Syria appears to ignore the main source of most human casualties and 
violence in the current conflict, which is the regime of Bashar al-Assad. 
  
There are many other concrete points that a transnational feminist solidarity can and 
should address, starting by putting pressure on their own governments to change their 
hypocritical positions towards regional players, most notably Turkey, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia. Erdogan‘s government, for example, has been actively supporting ISIS, 
supplying them with weapons, free mobility and fighters, and most recently bombing 
PKK positions, arresting Kurdish and leftist activists resisting ISIS and engaging in a 
brutal crack down on the Kurdish population in south-eastern Turkey. So far this has 
not led to an international outcry or much actual pressure being put on the Turkish 
government. Another important demand that feminists can advocate for is an end to 
impunity where sexual and gender-based violence is concerned, stressing both the 
historical context and the broad spectrum of gender-based violence and its 
perpetrators. At the same time, feminists in Europe and North- America have a 
responsibility to intervene in more and more right-wing discussions and policies 
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around immigration. Over the past years, migration and border control have 
increasingly become feminist issues, reflecting current intersectional configurations of 
power. 
 
Finally, I would advocate for engagement, closer ties and cooperation with Iraqi and 
Kurdish women‘s organizations and activists in Iraq, in the region and in the diaspora. 
Women‘s rights activists in central and southern Iraq as well as the KRI have not only 
been providing humanitarian assistance, welfare and legal advise, but they have also 
been providing shelters for victims of gender-based and sexual violence, are 
advocating bravely against all forms of gender-based violence, are pushing for legal 
reforms and shifts in cultural attitudes, are raising awareness in media fora and are 
challenging the complicity of largely male politicians. Iraqi and Kurdish women‘s 
rights activists have also been at the forefront of challenging corruption, lack of 
transparency, political authoritarianism and sectarianism. Despite these concrete 
suggestions, I still hold that a dose of ambivalence, humility and doubt has to be 
integral to any transnational feminist solidarity at these troubling times. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                        
1 The group was formerly called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and 
is frequently referred to as Da‘ish or Daesh, the Arabic equivalent of ISIL). More 
recently, the group has renamed itself to the Islamic State (IS). In this article I use the 
ISIS, the term most commonly used in English media and academic circles. 
 
2 Gendered or gender-based violence (GBV) refers to violence against a person based 
on the normative roles linked to each gender contributing to and reproducing unequal 
power relations in a given society. GBV could lead to psychological, economic, 
physical or sexual harm and is often used interchangeably with violence against 
women (VAW). Men can also be victims and survivors of gender-based violence, 
often linked to their non-normative masculinity and/or sexuality. Sexual violence is 
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one specific continuum of GBV that refers to a wide range of threats, behaviours and 
acts that are sexual or sexualized, unwanted and committed without consent. Sexual 
violence might exist on an individual level but is often used more systematically to 
control, dominate and reinforce gender-based oppression and heteronormativity.        
 
3 For more details, see Human Rights Watch (1993) Genocide in Iraq, the Anfal 
Campaign Against the Kurds; and http://www.womenwarpeace.org/iraq/iraq.htm. 
 
4 Within Shi‘a Islam, Nikāḥ al-mutʿah (pleasure marriage), refers to an informal fixed 
term marriage that can be contracted without any witnesses. In practice, mutah is 
often used to legalise prostitution, but might also be used to sanction mutually 
consensual sexual relations. Particularly for women, there is a stigma attached to 
engaging in mutah marriages.  
   
5
 In the fourth edition ―Dabiq‖, ISIS‘ English-language digital magazine states said, 
according to sharia and verses in the Qu‘ran, female members of the Yezidi sect may 
legitimately be captured and forcibly made concubines or sexual slaves. 
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-
the-failed-crusade.pdf 
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